Subject: Prior-check Opinion on the ECHA’s whistleblowing procedure (case 2015-1029)

Dear [...],

On 19 November 2015, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) received a notification for prior checking under Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 (‘the Regulation’) on the whistleblowing procedure at the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) from the Data Protection Officer (DPO) of the ECHA.2

The EDPS has issued Guidelines on how to process personal information within a whistleblowing procedure (‘the Guidelines’).3 Therefore, the description of the facts and of the legal analysis will only mention those aspects which differ from these Guidelines or otherwise need improvement. In the light of the accountability principle guiding his work, the EDPS would nonetheless like to highlight that all relevant recommendations made in the Guidelines apply to the processing operations put in place for whistleblowing at the ECHA.

EDPS recommendations and reminders are highlighted in bold below.

2 As this is an ex-post case, the deadline of two months does not apply. This case has been dealt with on a best-effort basis. The case has been pending the reply of ECHA in relation to questions about security measures. On 29 January 2018 we informed the ECHA by email that, in order to proceed with the case, we will include a recommendation about the security for this processing activity in the Opinion.
Description and assessment

1. **Transfer information on a case-by-case basis**

Whistleblowing procedures are intended to provide safe channels for anyone who becomes aware of and reports potential fraud, corruption, or other serious wrongdoings and irregularities. ECHA’s internal procedures state, under point 2 on internal whistleblowing, that the recipient of the information is obliged to transmit the information received without delay to OLAF. It is furthermore mentioned that while the staff member concerned has a choice of reporting channels, the information should ultimately reach OLAF in a short period of time.

In light of the above, the EDPS points out that OLAF is the competent body to investigate fraud against the EU budget and alleged serious misconduct. Since the scope of the whistleblowing procedure is not limited to potential fraud only, there is a possibility that ECHA may receive information that it is not within the competence of OLAF. In accordance with Article 7(1) of the Regulation, the transfer of personal information should only take place when necessary for the legitimate performance of tasks covered by the competence of the recipient. Therefore, **ECHA should assess, on a case-by-case basis, the requirements for transferring the personal information to OLAF and adapt the internal procedures accordingly.**

2. **Ensure confidentiality of all persons implicated in a whistleblowing report**

The EDPS welcomes the fact that ECHA ensures the protection of the whistleblower’s identity but **reminds the ECHA that the accused person should be protected in the same manner as the whistleblower.** The reason is due to a possible risk of stigmatisation and victimisation of that person within the organisation to which they belong. The accused persons will be exposed to such risks even before they are aware that they have been incriminated and before the alleged facts have been investigated to determine whether they are substantiated.

3. **Security measures**

[...]

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In light of the accountability principle, the EDPS trusts that ECHA will ensure that these considerations and recommendations are fully implemented. The EDPS has therefore decided to close case 2015-1029.

Yours sincerely,

*(signed)*

Wojciech Rafał WIEWIÓROWSKI

Cc:  [...], DPO, ECHA