

# Cryptography beyond message encryption

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# Example 1: Decentralized privacy-preserving proximity tracing













## Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing

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
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
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
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# Cryptography as a support for privacy



- The App creates a **secret every day (TEK)** and from this key it derives **random identifiers (RPIs)** that it broadcasts via Bluetooth
- A random identifier is used for a limited amount of time
- Without the key, no-one can link two identifiers



# Example 2: Datashare Network

## Decentralized search engine for journalists




# Datashare Network

## Goal

Journalists can search on others' collections for keywords of interest

- Only ICIJ and associates can use the system
- Query content is not revealed
- Searching is anonymous
- Journalists can anonymously converse with journalists that have matching documents





Journalists can search on others' collections for keywords of interest

- Only ICIJ and associates can use the system

## ATTRIBUTE-BASED CREDENTIALS

Prove attributes in “Zero-knowledge”

“I am a member of the organization”  
Prove that you have a signature of the organization on a secret you only know




Journalists can search on others' collections for keywords of interest

- Query content is not revealed

(MULTI SET) PRIVATE SET INTERSECTION

Find (cardinality of) the intersection between two sets without learning anything about the rest of the elements



# Anonymous communications

Journalists can search on others' collections for keywords of interest


- Searching is anonymous

## ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATIONS

Rerouting to hide IPs

Tor  or Nym 

Encryption not only hides content, also avoids tracing messages across routers




Journalists can search on others' collections for keywords of interest

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## ANONYMOUS ASYNCHRONOUS MESSAGING

Cryptography to establish rendez-vous pigeonholes only known to conversation partners

Dummy messages (encrypted for indistinguishability)



Encryption is a **KEY** tool for privacy, because it can do **MUCH MORE** than hiding the content of messages

Ensure **unlinkability**: messages, actions, authentications, of a user cannot be linked over time

Enable **anonymous authentication** while still providing guarantees against misuse

Enable **private search** and multi-party operations without revealing data

Provide **common knowledge** to bootstrap further private actions



**Thank you for  
your attention**

**Carmela  
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