

Agenda

- Experiences with many cloud providers
- Different categories of pseudonymous personal data
- Processor or joint controller
- Claimed exceptions on access rights





What cloud providers en services?























IBM Cloud

















DPIA approach Privacy Company: legal and technical










DPIA approach Privacy Company: legal and technical








Different kinds of Diagnostic Data

- <u>Telemetry data</u>: installed software applications and browsers collect and send data about the individual use of the services to the mothership
- <u>Service generated server logs</u>: cloud providers register all end user activities in their own logs
- <u>SIEM logs</u>: some personal data such as IP addresses in SIEM (security) logs
- Webserver access logs: restricted and public access webpages
- <u>Traffic to third parties</u>: cookies, support tickets, sometimes even Content Data (crash logs, spam/malware/CSAM scanning)



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
6 types of personal data







Inspection methods processing at cloud providers







Pseudonymous data are personal data

- Artikel 4(5) GDPR: pseudonymisation' means the processing of personal data in such a manner (...)
- Diagnostic data with unique identifiers are personal data
- Most cloud providers store diagnostic data for a long period of time in a singe database. Hashing or other kinds of pseudonymisation do not help as companies can attach new information to the existing data with the same formula.





Example of Microsoft Windows 10 telemetry event

```
"ver": "3.0",
"name": "Census.Enterprise",
"time": "2019-01-23T07:12:19.6354125Z",
"cV": "OHkC3yxxkkqvfwQc.0",
"iKey": "o:0a89d516ae714e01ae89c96d185e9ae3",
"flags": 514,
"ext": {
"utc": {
 "pgName": "WINCORE",
 "flags": 908067332,
  "epoch": "1108672",
 "seq": 17 },
 "os": {
                                                                                                                                                   Standard header
  "bootId": 11.
  "name": "Windows",
  "ver": "10.0.17763.195.amd64fre.rs5_release.180914-1434" },
  "id": "W:0000f519feec486de87ed73cb92d3cac802400000001000064cd6dc111ba59b11923e2ec26825c75ee6ab7aa1devicecensus.exe".
  "ver": "2096/05/22:02:17:09!12DE0!devicecensus.exe",
 "asId": 147 },
 "device": {
  "localId": "s:0694CCC4-88C9-4A58-AD5D-7905553CE3E9",
 "deviceClass": "Windows.Desktop" },
 "protocol": {
  "devMake": "VMware, Inc.",
 "devModel": "VMware Virtual Platform" },
"user": { "localid": "w:B04E2543-63EB-D3C6-4722-FBFE64FA31C0" },
"loc": { "timeZone": "+01:00" } },
"data": {
"IsCloudDomainJoined": "0",
"IsMDMEnrolled": "0",
"CDJType": 4294967295,
"ServerFeatures": "#",
                                                                                                                                              Event specific data
"CommercialId": "#".
"AzureVMType": "#",
"AzureOSIDPresent": false,
 "IsDomainJoined": "1",
"HashedDomain": "fcd5c26eb73477b14760d9b21464c355ee2f682243ce5907cd356cf54f935467.6f9478eb2551c0756bdb6eed6710764fa47ccd14bef780537b09c655169674db.cc1962a142a7828f7ec3013845b510522f71d67983758ecd61b5aefe38e18479".
 "SystemCenterID": "6GR0BPiesP/bl6jXJlbCxr88J1k5n581gDY/FC5m8nU=",
"MPNId": "#",
 "SCCMClientId": "#",
"IsDeviceProtected": "DEVICE NOT PROTECTED",
"IsDERequirementMet": "DEVICE REQ NOT MET|HW TPM NOT CONFIGRUED|SW GP MISCONFIGURED",
"IsEDPEnabled": "EDP NOT ENABLED",
"AADDeviceId": "#",
"ContainerType": 4294967295,
 "EnrollmentType": 4294967295 }
```





All kinds of unique identifiers in telemetry events

```
"ver": "3.0",
"name": "Census.Enterprise",
"time": "2019-01-23T07:12:19.6354125Z",
"cV": "OHkC3yxxkkqvfwQc.0",
"iKey": "o:0a89d516ae714e01ae89c96d185e9ae3",
"flags": 514,
"ext": {
"utc": {
 "pgName": "WINCORE",
  "flags": 908067332,
  "--------"-"1108672",
 "seq": 17 }...
  "bootId": 11.
 "name": "Windows",
 "ver": "10.0.17763.195.amd64fre.rs5_release.180914-1434" },
  "id": "W:0000f519feec486de87ed73cb92d3cac802400000001000064cd6dc111ba59b11923e2ec26825c75ee6ab7aa!devicecensus.exe".
  "ver": "2096/05/22:02:17:09!12DE0!devicecensus.exe",
 "actal"
 "device": {
 "localId": "s:0694CCC4-88C9-4A58-AD5D-7905553CE3E9"
 "deviceciass
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 "timeZone": "+01:00" }}.
"data": {
"IsCloudDomainJoined": "0",
"IsMDMEnrolled": "0",
"CDJType": 4294967295,
"ServerFeatures": "#",
 "CommercialId": "#".
"AzureVMType": "#",
"AzureOSIDPresent": false,
"IsDomain lain..."
 "HashedDomain": "fcd5c26eb73477b14760d9b21464c355ee2f682243ce5907cd356cf54f935467.6f9478eb2551c0756bdb6eed6710764fa47ccd14bef780537b09c655169674db.cc1962a142a7828f7ec3013845b510522f71d67983758ecd61b5aefe38e18479",
"SystemCenterID": "6GR0BPiesP/bl6jXJlbCxr88J1k5n581gDY/FC5m8nU=",
"MPNIa : #
"SCCMClientId": "#",
"IsDeviceProtected": "DEVICE_NOT_PROTECTED",
"IsDERequirementMet": "DEVICE REQ NOT MET|HW TPM NOT CONFIGRUED|SW GP MISCONFIGURED",
"IsEDPEnabled": "EDP NOT ENABLED",
"AADDeviceId": "#",
"ContainerType": 4294967295,
"EnrollmentType": 4294967295 }
```





Zoom telemetry events

```
"client_os":"mac",
                                              "client_os":"mac",
"client_type":"Zoom Main Client",
                                              "client_type":"Zoom Main Client",
"client_version":"5.3.52877.0927",
                                              "client_version":"5.3.52877.0927",
"event": "Tap Security",
                                              "event": "Recording",
"event_loc":"In Meeting",
                                              "event_loc":"In Meeting",
                                              "event_time":"9/30/2020 12:20:51",
"event_time":"9/30/2020 12:19:40",
"in_sharing":"o",
                                              "meeting_id":"68460188777",
"meeting_id":"focAptkITTSfHTiULJWSIw:=",
                                              "record":"toolbar-button",
"sub event":"",
                                              "sub event":"Cancel",
"user_id":"6n1pCAW4TT2qj5tmnGoKSq",
                                              "user_id":"6n1pCAW4TT2qj5tmnGoKSq",
"uuid":"3bdDCvtUdtqM7X
                                              "uuid":"3bdDCvtUdtqM7X
uLZf79WlDlu7jTmLQ2YNzdDLql7A="
                                              uLZf79WlDlu7jTmLQ2YNzdDLql7A="
                                              } ....
```





Google telemetry

Request Response Details	
POST https://play.google.com/log?format=json&hasfast=true&authuser=0 HTTP/2.0	
:authority	play.google.com
content-length	7493
authorization	SAPISIDHASH 1b45f00a708da7a8214028d07039b9a535eefd95
x-goog-authuser	0
user-agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Ge cko) Chrome/79.0.3945.130 Safari/537.36
content-type	application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=UTF-8
2000pt	*/*
origin	https://docs.google.com
x-client-uata	CK21yQEIjrb3AQillbkpcrozyQEIqZ3KAQj0n8oBCJytygEIy67KAQi9sMoBCPe0ygEIl7XKAQia
	tcoBC021ygEYq6TKARjzscoB
sec-fetch-site	same-site
sec-fetch-mode	cors
referer	https://docs.google.com/
accept-encoding	gzip, deflate, br
accept-language	nl-NL,nl;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
cookie	CONSENT=WP.283188; SID=tQcsVJGV5MhaLYlzUlOiHljSbOF-BEK62e7az0Cf2QA-RGPQcMIIH g0Ny_er0jKF-ePAw.;Secure_3PSID=tQcsVJGV5MhaLYlzUlOiHljSbOF-BEK62e7az0Cf2QA-RGPQoPi4sc0DVTb5FujDkrZo_g.; HSID=Ayq3T4Z5CqzKXsa9c; SSID=A_Fr0juwFXCogZhyH; APISID=MlsrgIvJK1teb_1l/AdfvGkMD-wPQ8ebDZ; SAPISID=XDmc8lc1TFUjU8BY/AK1CUei5tlv3WFjZp;Secure-HSID=Ayq3T4Z5CqzKXsa9c;Secure-SSID=A_Fr0juwFXCogZhyH;Secure-APISID=MlsrgIvJK1teb_1l/AdfvGkMD-wPQ8ebDZ;Secure-3PAPISID=XDmc8lc1TFUjU8BY/AK1CUei5tlv3WFjZp; NID=197=igzDbVmkJddFjGTv8VgDomel8GZC8XzipRls85t91g3UP9qj-nik70GBYbBGjjtDjurL2jcCXP_m2h6_7TuT9XC0n9QmBER0EFRv-fAtFeqJ4qv5Yj4i0i-jtktVEN0-hfYnJGAjmIMLPyS2XopKgVEdImR2S9B3aQCn76LivhsB8Pr-9icHfjCx8l2d78BU33FlA5jmrWyvPZJbqRmjsX9bd4Ox; 1P_JAR=2020-1-31-13; SIDCC=AN0-TYtAVF3-EwJsi_uwTv8We6P6e9lu2U-FkojqREEn31UM9C_X030N58KGmA6LixmAWq9feR0

null,"[[[null,null,169,1580476512088000,[[[1536,754,1536,824],false,[],null,1,4,null,null,null,null,null,true,null,null,n null, l, null, nul null, \"n\\,\"n\\,"n\ l,null,null,\"en\",null,null,null,null,null,[\"Trek het aandacht van uw lezers met een voolzeggend citaat uit dat dokumen t of gebruik dit ruimte om \",\"veelzeggend\",40,50,[],3,0,18,0,[[null,18,3,0]],0,null,[\"0\",\"0\"],[],[],[],[],null,null,9 , null, null rue], null, l,null,null,null,null,null,false],1,null,[null,[1580476513694000,1580476513694000],2],null,29816,null,172,173]],[\"CN3I35 31recCFag2yAodHJYPqg\",1580476356912000,1580476355044000,\"ADFN-csVdZDfAh0ctItx_VxWBR1B7epZClfM3P-odk20bYGx6kY4cYftq82JfS x1fQxv0K16IoLT\",null,9],[\"en\",\"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0: Win64:

.....

x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.130 Safari/537.36\",\"11zD5-qL51rHJiPn7kLF2tBM60d0JKHqiHKqX0o





Key problem: cloud provider as data controller







Joint controllership cloud providers with Enterprise customers

- Cloud providers often claim to act as data processor, but formal roles and contracts are not leading
- If a processor allows itself to determine processing purposes in its own interest,
 such as marketing or product innovation, it factually behaves as controller
- Most cloud providers omit to provide public documentation about the Diagnostic and Website Data
- The risk of factual, unintended joint controllership for the Diagnostic Data is that end users cannot exercise their data protection rights






Microsoft DSAR tools: audit logs, DDV and DSAR tool for diagnostic data

- (Query on) audit logs: always contain directly identifiable data, such as user ID, Organisation ID, IP address, subject header and addressees of mails, type of action + exact time
- <u>Diagnostic Data Viewer Tool</u>: shows very limited amount of telemetry events per app (less than 10%)
- New DSAR tool for Diagnostic Data: hodgepodge of undocumented files. Mostly with pseudonymised identifiers for the user and the tenant, such as "UserId": "b2814ab7-ocdb-4b7c-98fe-26deea388bb3"
- No access to Required Service Data
- No access to controller data (Windows, Edge)





Microsoft Diagnostic Data Viewer







Microsoft DSAR tool for Diagnostic Data

./a42a5d8foc984421955do1a4e24b5336/c814ff83c1324f8o9ff3d7fao5a821f7/351751o.json

```
This file contains 39 events recorded during the tests performed for this report. Example:
"time": "",
"correlationId": "",
"properties": {
"Browser": "Firefox",
"BrowserVersion": "91",
"env_time": "2021-08-24 13:23:11.5473232",
"lpAddress": "185.213.106.92",
"ObjectId": "b2814ab7-ocdb-4b7c-98fe-26deea388bb3",
"OfferId": "MS-AZR-0044P",
"operationName": "SectionCompleted-PhoneVerification",
"OriginalEventTimestamp": "Tue, 24 Aug 2021 13:23:11 GMT",
"Platform": "Unknown",
"Puid": "1003200138B0D6A3"
```



https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/compliance/regulatory/gdpr-dsr-Office365#part-3-responding-to-dsrs-for-system-generated-logs



AWS, Oracle, Micrososoft Azure, Google Cloud VMs and databases

- Documentation and access for admins to detailed audit logs, but -generally- no individual take-out of end user data (system administrators)
- No access to data exchanged via market places (app stores)
- No access to cookies and data in webserver access log
- No access to all security logs that the provider creates behind the screens.



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Claimed exceptions on access rights

- company confidential / non relevant internal information
- privacy of other data subjects
- technically too difficult
- not in a position to reliably identify the data subject
- referral to third parties





Dissection of refusal arguments

- <u>Company confidential</u>: If you can intercept personal data such as <u>telemetry</u> <u>events</u> in the network traffic, they cannot be company confidential (already made public). *Interception and access did reveal sensitive contents of telemetry data.* With regard to detailed <u>security logging</u>: the provider should provide access in the context of a DPIA to the customer's own data, and publish the results of an independent audit of the contents, retention periods and possible onward transfers to 3d parties. *Access did reveal unknown 3d parties (malware scanning)*
- <u>Cannot reliably identify</u>: must accept means such as identification in person, combination of timestamps with unique identifiers, bring along test device, provide full network capture, including identifiers





Dissection of refusal arguments

- Too difficult to identify: if the core business of a provider is to sell targeted ads based on these data, the categorical refusal to provide access is untenable. The provider must build the logs in such a way that access can be provided upon request without disclosing other individuals' personal data (Art 11 + Art 25 design)
- Referral to third parties: Customer/controllers must be able provide to access to traffic exchanged with third parties via their website. If they are joint controllers with for example Facebook for a Facebook Page, they must design a mechanism to provide access to these data



Conclusions

- Cloud providers must provide complete answers to DSAR, as controller <u>and</u> as processor (Art. 28(3) under e, f and h of the GDPR)
- If access to pseudonymous data is denied, the customer/controller cannot assess the scale and impact of the data processing
- Risk of factual joint controllership without division of responsibilities
- Lack of transparency about diagnostic data may be intentional or accidental:
 DSARs are necessary to assess accuracy of public documentation
- In view of the dynamic nature of telemetry data, end users should be able to get semi realtime access





Questions?

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