Investigations

Opinion of 13 February 2008 on a notification for prior checking on the data processing carried out in the framework of administrative enquiries and disciplinary proceedings (Case 2007-582)

Letter to the President of the College of Chiefs of Administration relating to administrative inquiries and disciplinary proceedings (Case 2006-75)

Opinion of 18 December 2007 on a notification for prior checking on the fraud notification service (Case 2007-481)

• ensuring the deletion of pointless messages as well as avoiding asking questions that would lead informants to disclose information that is irrelevant for the purposes of detecting fraud and corruption affecting the financial interests of the Community.
• ensuring the right to information, access and rectification to those who have been named by the users of the Fraud Notification Service, subject to the application of the exceptions provided for in the Regulation.
• ensuring that the conservation period of irrelevant information is kept as short as possible and in any event for no longer than one year.
• inserting a link in the privacy policy at the webpage through which visitors who want to use the Fraud Notification Service must necessarily go through or alternatively in a very prominent way, immediately after or before the information on the Fraud Notification Service.

Opinion of 20 November 2007 on a notification for prior checking on "Council Regulation (EC) 1469/95" (Case 2007-215)

Opinion of 21 November 2007 on a notification for prior checking on information and intelligence data pool and intelligence databases (Joint cases 2007-27 and 2007-28)

Information and Intelligence Data Pool” is the description given to all data held within the remit of Operational Intelligence Unit C4 in OLAF, including the Intelligence Databases.

Operational Information and Intelligence support are essential aspects of OLAF’s mandate to fight fraud, corruption, and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the European Community, and serious matters relating to the discharge of professional duties - as established in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) n° 1073/1999 and Commission Decision 1999/352/EC Article 2 (5).

The purpose of the processing under analysis is then to further OLAF intelligence/analysis and operational activity. It also aims to support specific case requests, operations and investigations with a view to ensuring the optimum accuracy and relevance of information received, disseminated and otherwise processed for intelligence, financial, administrative, disciplinary and judicial use. This support may be provided throughout the various stages of OLAF investigation and operational activities, over all sectors and is recorded within the CMS (Case Management System) where applicable.

OLAF’s operational intelligence role also includes supporting the control, intelligence and enforcement activities in Member States, for OLAF partners and Operational DGs. Chapter 2.4.3 of the OLAF Manual further explains the role of OLAF's operational intelligence.

In his prior checking Opinion, the EDPS issued the main following recommendations:

• to acknowledge in the intelligence files when any restriction based on Article 20 of the Regulation is operated;
• to respect the confidentiality of the identity of whistleblowers during OLAF intelligence activities and in the later stages when appropriate;
• to provide the information (Article 12 of the Regulation) to the data subjects whose names appear in the documentation under analysis, but who are not persons concerned, witnesses, whistleblowers or informants, unless such activity would be impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort, in which case the obligation to provide directly the information could only be replaced by the indirect provision through the privacy statement published on the OLAF website. The same principle should be applied when intelligence activities are conducted independently of an investigation;
• to supplement the publication on the website with personalised information notices addressed to individuals (unless such activity would be impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort). The EDPS therefore calls upon OLAF to develop practices in providing personalised information to the individuals concerned to the degree it is appropriate in the context of intelligence activities and inform the EDPS about such guidelines.